. . . what does the survey really matter anyway - all that matters is Personal Knowledge -- there are statements about probable events, and statements that might be probable {as in truth} (but these aren't the same thing) but, why would I place higher value on knowledge created via a theory on the relationship between two *statements* about probable events, versus knowledge I experience first-hand, and my own assertions of what's probable (based on a logical relationship; empirically validated sensory experience between what I know and what I see).
Polanyi defines a theory as "something other than myself" (p. 4). He draws a connection between maps and theories. "A theory may be regarded as a kind of map extended over space and time" (p. 4). The question he poses, is, should we consider as more objective the form of knowledge that relies "to a greater measure on theory rather than on more immediate sensory experience" (p. 4). He goes on to point out the strengths of theory.
1) A theory is "objective knowledge" as far as it is not I. However it can be proved wrong when I use it.
2) A theory cannot be led astray by my personal illusions.
3) Theories can be constructed without regard to "one's normal approach to experience" (p. 6). However, for this to make theories more "objective" than personal experience means that we have to value the fact that theory may disregard our "terrestrial location," equally applying to inhabitants of all the earth: "provided they share our intellectual values" (p. 6).
Regarding the issue of Personal Knowledge and Vygotsky, although Vygotsky is not cited in the index, Polanyi speaks favorably of gestalt psychology, but Vygotsky does not. However, if as Vygotsky says, we internalize tools that help us know, it would seem to me if you bought that, you'd have to buy the existence and utter superior importance of Personal Knowledge because Personal Knowledge simply reflects an individual's internalization of the tools and ways of knowing in her culture.
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