Sunday, September 30, 2007
Grading of Confidence
The rhetoric of probability is really what Polanyi is discussing, although he does not say so or call it rhetoric. And so, if we can measure levels of confidence statistically, then we should also be able to measure levels of confidence by asking people how confident they are. Either way, it is a "grading of confidence" that is constructed rhetorically.
What is the probability that something is random? Like the sidewalk that leads up to my front door. What is the probability that the cement arranged itself that way, accidentally? Polanyi discusses this sort of thing to make a point.
Ong and Vygotsky and Gestalt psychology
Gestalt psychology was important to Vygotsky because he was critiquing it in his own work. Gestalt psychology was a response to the behaviorists and the experimental psychologists, who agreed that psychological processes could be studied by analyzing “basic constituents” (Cole & Scribner’s intro to Vygotsky, _Mind in Society_). Gestalt psychology rejected the notion that complex processes could be accounted for by examining simple processes.
Later in 1988, Ong argues that writing is a technology, and that “more than any other single invention, writing has transformed human consciousness” (p. 77). I'm not sure about this idea of "transforming" and "structuring." This I am still thinking about because I think I might disagree that that is what writing does. So, I have to think about the differences between "mediation" and "structuring."
What I wanted to talk about was the differences between Polanyi and Vygotsky, but I'm not there yet. Obviously their focuses are very different, but what I mean is how are they different when it comes to their views of knowing.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Population - 50% random selection -- 75%
Response bias is a concern. Inferential statistics used in analyzing date from surveys assumes that 100% of the respondents returned the surveys. response rate is one guide to the overall representativeness of the survey participants. Response bias is less when a large number of individuals return the surveys. Response bias is more when few return the survey. Respondents are self-selecting anyway, and that result is pronounced when few return the survey. As Babbie (2004) points out, with a low response rate, there is usually something more going on than unwillingness to take the survey when you get a low response rate.
So far, I have contacted 50% of my entire population -- my census. And so, I have to navigate whether I am going to go to 75%, or whether if I go to 75% I might as well go to 100% and have a survey of the entire census rather than a random selection.
Interestingly, my biggest concern here is that I told the first two groups that they were randomly selected, and so if I go with 100%, that won't be true. So I worry about my researcher image and its credibility.
Response Rates on Surveys - Follow-up Mailings
I would imagine since the purpose of the survey was clearly stated towards digital composing and copyright, it might be that those who did not respond did not think they were qualified, did not think it was important, didn't understand what I was talking about, etc. I intuit that even when what appeared to be valid reasons for not participating, such as business-- still, the reasons might be more complicated. If your program is represented in the survey, and gets all the copyright questions wrong, that won't look good for the program. However, I really have no sure way of knowing who from what program answers in what way, since at the end of the survey individuals are asked to name their school - they can also choose other or can't answer.
Babbie does concede that the literature varies widely on what is an acceptable response rate. I'd think that since explaining context is so important in our field, regardless of my return rate, I will need to qualify taking anything seriously from the survey results. It may occur that the only purpose of the survey turns out the provide sorting for students who might be interviewed.
Babbie has some interesting observations and hints regarding follow-up mailings. There should be two follow-ups, at two week intervals. For Phase One, I've done the first follow-up. I will do one more the week after next after excluding those who responded to my first reminder. Next week I will do Phase Four, which is the follow-up to those I have not heard from regarding Phase Two (recruitment for folks from the second population).
Amazingly, after sending initial recruitment emails to both populations of 50, I had received exactly 6 responses from each group, for a total of 12. I used two different strategies for recruitment. In the first instance, I had a long formal email of 800 words. It included the faculty recruitment email cut and pasted at the bottom. I did not include a link to the survey. For the second phase, I cut the email down to 200 words, included the faculty recruitment email as an attachment, and included a link to the survey. In both cases, amazingly, 6 people responded. The only difference was that in phase two when I included the link to the survey, I received the responses faster.
Thursday, September 27, 2007
Personal Knowledge
. . . what does the survey really matter anyway - all that matters is Personal Knowledge -- there are statements about probable events, and statements that might be probable {as in truth} (but these aren't the same thing) but, why would I place higher value on knowledge created via a theory on the relationship between two *statements* about probable events, versus knowledge I experience first-hand, and my own assertions of what's probable (based on a logical relationship; empirically validated sensory experience between what I know and what I see).
Polanyi defines a theory as "something other than myself" (p. 4). He draws a connection between maps and theories. "A theory may be regarded as a kind of map extended over space and time" (p. 4). The question he poses, is, should we consider as more objective the form of knowledge that relies "to a greater measure on theory rather than on more immediate sensory experience" (p. 4). He goes on to point out the strengths of theory.
1) A theory is "objective knowledge" as far as it is not I. However it can be proved wrong when I use it.
2) A theory cannot be led astray by my personal illusions.
3) Theories can be constructed without regard to "one's normal approach to experience" (p. 6). However, for this to make theories more "objective" than personal experience means that we have to value the fact that theory may disregard our "terrestrial location," equally applying to inhabitants of all the earth: "provided they share our intellectual values" (p. 6).
Regarding the issue of Personal Knowledge and Vygotsky, although Vygotsky is not cited in the index, Polanyi speaks favorably of gestalt psychology, but Vygotsky does not. However, if as Vygotsky says, we internalize tools that help us know, it would seem to me if you bought that, you'd have to buy the existence and utter superior importance of Personal Knowledge because Personal Knowledge simply reflects an individual's internalization of the tools and ways of knowing in her culture.